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defendant. Defendants in the state court action moved for a stay
until disposition of the federal action. This motion was denied.
The court noted that although neither the state nor the federal
court had jurisdiction over all three causes of action, many of the
issues were common to both proceedings, so that, on the basis of collateral estoppel, an adjudication of the state court action would foreclose relitigation of these common issues in the federal action. In addition, the defendants failed to show that conveniences would be
served by giving the federal action precedence, or that added
expenses would be involved in permitting the state action to
proceed to trial. Therefore, the court denied the motion for a
stay, on condition that, in the federal action, the plaintiff stipulate
that any beneficial collateral estoppel effect which the state court
judgment would have on the state court defendants would also be
6
fully accorded to the additional defendant in the federal action.
The decision in Gallo is illustrative of the broad discretionary
powers exercised by courts deciding motions to stay under CPLR
3211(a) (4). 69 This section provides that, where another related
action is pending between the same parties, the court, in lieu of a
dismissal, may issue "such order as justice requires." This broad
authorization for judicial discretion is clearly justifiable, for in
instances of parallel litigation, the requirements and circumstances
of any particular case will determine what order the court should
issue.70
CPLR 3211(a) (5): Statute of limitations in annulment action.
Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose 71 which compel
the exercise of a right of action within a designated time. When
affirmatively pleaded, these statutes bar stale claims by denying a
do not extinguish the cause of action, right or
remedy; they
72
obligation.

Distinguishable from statutes of limitations are statutes which
create a right of action and annex conditions to that right. Such
an enactment makes the time limitation an essential part of the
statute out of which the right in question arises, so that a lapse
of the statutory period operates to extinguish the right altogether.
Such time qualifications annexed to a statutory cause of action,
therefore, become jurisdictional elements that cannot be waived
73
merely because they were not specially pleaded by the parties.
681d. at 388, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300.
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70 Iid.
71 Shoemaker v. Benedict, 11 N.Y. 176 (1854).
72 Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 261, 91 N.E. 582 (1910).
73 United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48 (1898).
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Whether a legislative enactment is a statute of limitations
or whether it is a time limitation inherent in the substantive cause
of action itself may be ascertained from a proper construction of
its terms. Generally, in those instances where the limitation clause
is found in the section which creates the right of action, the time
limitation 74will be construed as being part of the substantive cause
of action.

This distinction is illustrated by Shoddy v. Shoddy,75 where
plaintiff brought a marital action for annulment on the ground
of fraud. The action was commenced five years after the discovery
of the alleged fraud. The court, in dismissing the complaint, held
that it was required to apply the three-year period of limitations
even though the time limitation was not pleaded as a defense.
The court noted that the inclusion of the three-year time limitation
in both CPLR 214(7) and Section 140(e) of the Domestic
Relations Law indicated an intent on the part of the legislature
to make time a substantive condition of the action. Therefore, once
the time limitation had elapsed, the court was without jurisdiction
to pronounce a decree dissolving the marriage.76
CPLR 3211(e): Inclusion of counterclaim in answer not a waiver
of jurisdictional objection.
In M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale &

Sons, Inc. 7 7 defendant's answer contained both a jurisdictional

objection and a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction
sued upon by the plaintiff. The appellate division, first department,
held that the defendant did not waive its jurisdictional objection
by the inclusion of the counterclaim in its answer.
There does not appear to be a substantial reason why a
jurisdictional objection should be lost merely because it is coupled
with a defense on the merits,7 and also joined with a counterclaim which reflects "the same issues as that defense." 79 CPLR
320(b) specifies that the proper place for a counterclaim is in the
answer, and CPLR 3211(e) provides that defendant may raise
his jurisdictional objection either by way of motion or in the
answer. Thus, it would be inconsistent for the court to say that
defendant's jurisdictional objection is waived by including a counterclaim in the very place authorized by the CPLR.
74The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886).

7550 Misc. 2d 74, 269 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1966).
761d. at 74-75, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
77 26 App. Div. 2d 52, 270 N.Y.S2d 672 (1st Dep't 1966).
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